James Shein

Shein, James B. and Evan Meagher. 2008. Winn-Dixie Stores in 2005 (A): Cleanup on Aisle 11. Case 5-408-751(A) (KEL415).

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence.

Instead of improving the company’s position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving.

Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy.

Students will take the view that Paul “Flip” Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Shein, James B. and Scott Kannry. 2012. The Chicago Blackhawks: Greatest Sports Business Turnaround Ever?. Case 5-112-007 (KEL671).

This case explores the turnaround and corporate renewal of the Chicago Blackhawks professional hockey team, which transformed from one of the worst-run organizations in all of professional sports in 2007 to one that won the Stanley Cup (the National Hockey League championship trophy) in 2010.

W. Rockwell "Rocky" Wirtz was faced with making critical decisions shortly after inheriting the team from his father, who was the individual most associated with the organization's decline. The team faced financial trouble and had narrowly avoided missing payroll; the previous customer relations strategy (which included refusing to televise home games or to conduct effective marketing) had resulted in significantly diminished brand value; and management and player personnel were devoid of effective leadership. At its nadir, the team was named "The Worst Franchise in Professional Sports" by ESPN in 2004. After assuming control, Rocky embarked on an ambitious corporate renewal strategy that included the following components:
• Leadership: Install a new management team with clear goals and creative ideas about how to turn around the organization
• Culture: Reward players for accomplishing their goals and establish a performance-based culture
• Financial: Seek new corporate sponsorships and increase ticket prices once the team established a winning record
• Brand and Marketing: Send a clear message that the team was intent upon winning the championship and design a customer-focused marketing strategy

Shein, James B. and Loredana Yamada. 2008. Sara Lee: A Tale of Another Turnaround. Case 5-108-009 (KEL353).

Sara Lee Corporation's acquisition binge in the 1980s and 1990s left the company with a portfolio of vastly different businesses operating independently of one another. It had experienced rapid top-line growth, but at the same time cash flows had declined. Sara Lee ignored both internal and external warning signs until a major transformation plan became necessary. This case examines the company's multiple turnaround attempts. The learning objective of the case is to analyze "early stage" turnaround efforts by examining how the company found itself in decline, evaluating its attempts to improve its performance, and assessing the turnaround plan.

Shein, James B., Rebecca Frazzano and Evan Meagher. 2010. A Tale of Two Turnarounds at EDS: The Jordan Rules. Case 5-409-754 (KEL425).

The case briefly describes EDS’s history under Ross Perot and GM before turning to the beginning of a tumultuous decade in the late 1990s. As the turn of the century approached, EDS made critical strategic missteps such as missing opportunities in the Internet space, overlooking the onset of client-server computing, and failing to obtain major Y2K-related projects. The company attempted a turnaround by replacing the CEO with Dick Brown, whose leadership helped streamline the sprawling company. Despite initial successes, Brown’s tenure ultimately ended in failure, due largely to his failure to recognize the growing Indian market and his willingness to buy business at the expense of the company’s margin. The disastrous multibillion-dollar Navy & Marine Corp Intranet contract typified the type of high-profile transactions that Brown pursued, often boosting EDS’s stock price in the short term while eroding its cash flow short term and its profitability over the long term. EDS management went through several stages of the turnaround process: the blinded phase, the inactive phase, and the faulty action phase, until Michael Jordan replaced Brown as CEO and enacted a three-tiered operational, strategic, and financial turnaround.

Shein, James B. and Judith Crown. 2010. Atari: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Case 5-210-260 (KEL539).

Atari, a maker of video games, went through several owners over the years winding up controlled by Infogrames, a French publisher of video games. Infogrames later sold Atari shares in a secondary public offering, eventually reducing the parent’s share to 51.6 percent by September 2005 creating a complicated two-tier ownership structure. Two levels of management made it difficult to get things done. The financial structure was a problem for Infogrames because the French company had to consolidate 100 percent of Atari’s results even though it only owned 51 percent of the company. Atari was generating substantial losses, had defaulted on its debt, and was faced with the possibility of filing for bankruptcy without more working capital.

The independent directors of Atari, when confronted with an unsolicited Infogrames buyout offer, had several options: (1) agree to the $1.68 offer (take the money and run); (2) pursue a white knight (a buyout from another investor of company that would be willing to pay a higher price and invest working capital); (3) file a lawsuit to stop the takeover to buy time or perhaps force Infogrames to increase its offer.

Shein, James B., Tim Joyce and Brandon Cornuke. 2010. Dry Goods. Case 5-210-263 (KEL509).

MBA students Tim Joyce and Brandon Cornuke had what they believed was a great product concept: a body powder that could be delivered in an aerosol spray. Current market-leading powders such as Gold Bond and Johnson’s Baby Powder involved messy application, as they were only available in “dump-on” form. Worse, because powders deposited on top of the skin didn’t adhere to it, they tended not to last long. Joyce and Cornuke believed an aerosol powder spray would solve these problems. They called their product concept Dry Goods.

However, taking Dry Goods from idea to reality presented some serious challenges. How would two students without access to a lab be able to research and develop a complex chemical/physical process like aerosol delivery, let alone manufacture it once they had a proven prototype? To address these problems, the two entrepreneurs sought out a contract manufacturing partner. After identifying a number of options, Joyce and Cornuke had to decide which partner offered them the best chances of success, given their goals and financial constraints.

Shein, James B., Robert Anstey and Nathan Lang. 2010. Elan Corporation Turnaround. Case 5-210-262 (KEL507).

The case begins with newly appointed chairman and interim CEO Garo Armen dwelling on the significant issues that Elan Corporation, an Irish pharmaceutical company, faces. Its share price has plummeted 96% after accusations of accounting fraud and the discontinuation of an important clinical trial due to the drug’s severe side effects. As a result, Elan faces insolvency. About $2 billion in debt that could no longer be satisfied in stock will soon mature, and there are questions regarding the company’s structure and various operating concerns. Armen is also concerned about the ethical consequences of the company’s failing and thus not being able to develop potentially life-saving medicines.

Armen must decide what the nature of Elan should be moving forward and what strategy it should adopt. The operational and financial issues discussed in the case are complicated by Elan’s status as an Irish company with significant international operations. The case closes with Armen reflecting on the decisions he has made—which students should critique and suggest alternatives to—as well as an open decision on choosing a successor CEO.

Shein, James B.. 2015. Flying J: Governance through Crash and Takeoff. Case 5-214-252 (KEL887).

Flying J was a family-owned company that operated travel plazas, oil refineries, a bank for trucking companies, and other related businesses. In early 2009, Crystal Call Maggelet, the majority shareholder and new CEO of Flying J, was tasked with saving the company founded by her father in 1968. In the intervening forty years Flying J had grown from four gas stations to a vertically integrated $18 billion company. Declining crude oil prices, decreased cash reserves, and multiple internal challenges forced most Flying J subsidiaries to file for bankruptcy protection. This came as a surprise to the company’s lenders, suppliers, customers, and employees, who did not know the company was in trouble until it was unable to meet payroll just days before Christmas 2008.

Maggelet was determined not only to return her family’s company to profitability but also to repay all of Flying J’s debts, retain as many of the firm’s 12,000 employees as possible, and avoid compromising employees’ savings (e.g., 401K retirement accounts). All of the company’s advisors told her it could not be done. They thought a more likely outcome would be paying creditors nine cents on every dollar owed. If that happened, Maggelet’s family’s holdings would be almost entirely wiped out according to the “priority of claims” rules in bankruptcy, and the family would end up with only 1.2 percent of a restructured Flying J.

However, to the surprise of its advisors and creditors, Flying J paid its debts in full, mostly by cutting operating costs before selling assets. The family was left with a smaller, but still very profitable company.

Shein, James B. and Evan Meagher. 2009. Leading Corporate Renewal: Selim Bassoul at Middleby Corporation. Case 5-209-253 (KEL422).

Middleby Corporation was a designer and manufacturer of commercial food processing and food service equipment for fast food as well as high-end restaurants. During the latter half of the 1990s, Middleby became increasingly unfocused as its number of product lines increased dramatically. Margins and sales slipped. At the same time, some of the company’s high-profile product development initiatives ended in failure.

Although Middleby’s top management recognized some of these apparent warning signs, rather than take action, they seemed eager to blame the disappointing results solely on the company’s overseas operations. This inaction caused Middleby’s financial performance to deteriorate further, resulting in violations of its loan covenants.

To finally correct the situation, Selim Bassoul was moved from his role as general manager of Middleby’s Southbend plant up to chief operating officer for the entire corporation. Bassoul had taken the underperforming Southbend plant and turned it into a star performer, correcting and improving customer service, operations, and finances and establishing a clear strategic direction.

Bassoul had to craft a turnaround plan for the entire company in the areas of strategy, operations, and finance. He cut the number of products substantially, fired some key customers after a customer profitability analysis, and focused product development on innovative products that saved Middleby’s customers time and money. Following these changes and others, the company returned to profitability and Bassoul was named CEO. Bassoul then decided to present a major acquisition opportunity to the board of directors.

Shein, James B.. 2014. Corporate Governance at Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia: Not "A Good Thing". Case 5-413-761 (KEL776).

The case opens with Martha Stewart’s 2005 release from prison following her conviction for obstructing an insider-trading investigation of her 2001 sale of personal stock. The scandal dealt a crippling blow to the powerful Martha Stewart brand and drove results at her namesake company, Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia (MSO), deep into the red. But as owner of more than 90 percent of MSO’s voting shares, Stewart continued to control the company throughout the scandal.

The company faced significant external challenges, including changing consumer preferences and mounting competition in all of its markets. Ad rates were under pressure as advertisers began fragmenting spending across multiple platforms, including the Internet and social media, where MSO was weak. New competitors were luring readers from MSO’s flagship publication, Martha Stewart Living. And in its second biggest business, merchandising, retailing juggernauts such as Walmart and Target were crushing MSO’s most important sales channel, Kmart. Internal challenges loomed even larger, with numerous failures of governance while the company attempted a turnaround.

This case can be used to teach either corporate governance or turnarounds.

Shein, James B. and Evan Meagher. 2017. Coming from Behind: The Chicago Cubs' Resurgence as a 100-Year-Old Startup. Case 5-117-004 (KE1000).

This "mini-case" summarizes the beloved Chicago Cubs' many years of futility and remarkable turnaround in the early teens of the twenty-first century. Central to the case is the concept that despite being an incredibly popular, billion-dollar franchise holding a special place in the hearts of Chicagoans for more than a century, the organization's sale from the Tribune Company in 2009 to the Ricketts family effectively required a full reboot of the company's infrastructure, akin to a startup or to a "carve-out" situation popular in the private equity world. The case resonates because the brand is easily recognizable in an industry with the unique dynamics of professional sports, and yet the company's situation features similarities to any lower-profile organization trying to build or rebuild its SG&A infrastructure from scratch.

Shein, James B.. 2015. CBD vs. Casino: How Brazil’s Biggest Retailer Fought a French Governance Takeover—and Lost. Case 5-115-003 (KEL909).

Brazilian retail markets had been a tempting arena for growth-minded companies since the country instituted democratic reforms in the 1980s. To raise capital for continued expansion, Abílio Diniz, the billionaire chairman of Brazil’s number-one retailer, Companhia Brasileira de Distribuição (CBD), entered a long-term agreement in 2005 to transfer control of the retail empire to the CEO of the French retailer Casino Guichard-Perrachon SA in 2012.

As the date for the planned takeover drew near, Diniz tried to get around his agreement with Casino by engaging in secret negotiations to create a new, Brazil-based partnership with Carrefour SA, Casino’s retailing archrival in France. Drawing on his network of influential advisors and investors and his close ties with government, Diniz secretly struck a plan to secure government-backed private funding to merge CBD with Carrefour’s Brazilian operations and install himself at the helm of a new retailing giant with a commanding Brazilian market share.

Once discovered, the proposal sparked a fierce counterattack by Casino’s chairman, Jean-Charles Naouri. Marshaling an army of lawyers, Naouri filed a request for international arbitration, raised Casino’s stake in CBD, and sought and won a French court order to raid Carrefour headquarters for documents. Naouri was able to enforce the 2005 agreement after persuading Brazilian officials to abandon their plans to support a CBD-Carrefour merger. The battle led to a permanent split between former partners Naouri and Diniz—and to Diniz’s eventual exit from the Brazilian retailing empire he had built.

Students will explore how weak corporate governance at CBD and in Brazil in general, as well as political and cultural differences between the two leaders and their respective nations, helped ignite one of the biggest intercontinental boardroom showdowns in history.

Shein, James B.. 2012. At Ford, Turnaround Is Job One. Case 5-211-250 (KEL663).

The case opens with the Ford Motor Company seemingly on the path toward bankruptcy. Ford had been bleeding red ink for more than ten years when it decided in 2006 that continuing the same turnaround attempts was not going to right the ship. The company was facing significant external challenges, such as intense competition and changing consumer preferences, as well as internal challenges, such as quality and design issues and a stifling level of corporate complexity.

As the case begins, CEO Bill Ford has taken the unusual step of hiring an auto industry outsider as his replacement. Alan Mulally, a thirty-seven-year Boeing veteran and principal architect of the venerable airplane manufacturer’s own massive and successful turnaround, wasted little time in getting about the business of remaking Ford. He developed a plan to:

• Focus on the Ford brand and divest the numerous other brands the company had acquired over the years
• Simplify and streamline the company’s manufacturing operations
• Remake the corporate culture from one of fiefdoms and false optimism to collaboration and facing reality

With an ardent belief in the plan’s viability, Mulally raised nearly $24 billion and began to put his plan into motion.

The case explores the many causes of this once-great company’s decline and the steps it took to beat the odds and get back on the path of profitability.

Shein, James B. and Evan Meagher. 2008. Winn-Dixie Stores in 2005 (B): Cleanup on Aisle 11. Case 5-408-751(B) (KEL416).

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence.

Instead of improving the company’s position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving.

Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy.

Students will take the view that Paul “Flip” Huffard, lead consultant from Blackstone LP, had in determining the valuation and new capital structure of the company. These decisions would be critical, as they affected what each creditor class would receive and whether Winn-Dixie could emerge from bankruptcy.

Shein, James B., Rebecca Frazzano and Evan Meagher. 2010. Solo Cup in 2007: Dollars in the Details. Case 5-210-261 (KEL505).

The case discusses the operational, strategic, and financial turnaround at Solo Cup, a manufacturer of disposable dining wares. Solo Cup’s troubles were compounded by the acquisition of a larger rival, Sweetheart Company, which had its own problems and presented issues of merger integration that management could not solve. David Garfield, a managing director at turnaround consulting firm Alix Partners, must first recognize Solo Cup’s core competencies in order to determine the appropriate change in strategic course, strip out the assets that no longer support the operations necessary for that strategy, and monetize them in order to rationalize its balance sheet. This case teaches that a three-pronged approach will invariably produce greater results than any one-dimensional turnaround.

Shein, James B., Nathan Haines, Matthew Horstmann, Tobias Kaulfuss, Craig Koester, William Koo and Juan Lariz Landin. 2008. Parmalat USA Turnaround. Case 5-208-253 (KEL356).

Senior managers in Parmalat SpA’s U.S. subsidiary (Parmalat USA)—many of whom were from the Italian parent company or other Parmalat entities—uprooted, cleaned out their offices, and left as the magnitude of the parent company’s fraud became known in late 2003. Parmalat USA had filed for bankruptcy in October 2003. With urgency and desperation, Enrico Bondi, the Extraordinary Commissioner of Parmalat SpA, had contacted the Milan office of AlixPartners, a global restructuring, consulting, and financial advisory firm. Bondi requested AlixPartners’ assistance in determining the cash situation at the U.S. subsidiary and helping lead the struggling division, which was now void of senior management. Jim Mesterharm, a managing director in AlixPartners’ Chicago office, was asked to lead this initiative as the chief restructuring officer. Parmalat SpA, often referred to as the Enron of Italy, was a trophy turnaround assignment at the outset for AlixPartners: for them, the worse the economic problem, the better the assignment.

Ninety days was enough time for Mesterharm and his team to determine what could be cut off and what discussions were needed with the U.S. vendors, customers, and employees. Mesterharm’s team changed the accounting methods from GAAP basis to cash basis. They constructed a 13-week cash flow model. Aggressive efforts were made to delay payables and to accelerate receivables to create cash. The battle to keep Parmalat USA afloat had begun.

The learning objective of the case is to:

1. Understand the circumstances leading to a catastrophic business failure and the required steps toward turnaround;
   
2. Learn how to manage multiple constituents through a dramatic turnaround situation;
   
3. Experience the role of a consultant in the turnaround process of a large company;
   
4. Expose students to international issues in management of turnarounds.