Laura Doval
Assistant Professor of Business at Columbia Business School
Schools
- Columbia Business School
Links
Biography
Columbia Business School
Laura Doval is an Assistant Professor in the Economics Division at Columbia University. Her research focuses on information economics, mechanism design, and market design. Prior to joining Columbia, she was an Assistant Professor of Economics at the California Institute of Technology and a Postdoctoral Research Associate at the Cowles Foundation, Yale University. She received her PhD from Northwestern University.
Education
- Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.) Northwestern University (2010 — 2016)
- Master's degree Northwestern University (2010 — 2011)
- Master's Degree Universidad Torcuato Di Tella (2009 — 2010)
- Licenciada en Economia Universidad Torcuato di Tella (2005 — 2008)
Companies
- Assistant Professor Of Economics Columbia Business School (2020)
- Assistant Professor Caltech (2017 — 2020)
- Postdoctoral Associate Cowles Foundation (2016 — 2017)
- Graduate Student Research Assistant Northwestern University (2010 — 2016)
Publications
- L. DOVAL AND V. SKRETA (December 2021), “Mechanism Design with Limited Commitment,” accepted at Econometrica
- DOVAL, L. (2021): “Dynamically Stable Matching,” Forthcoming, Theoretical Economics.
- L. DOVAL AND JEFFREY C. ELY (2020): “Sequential Information Design,” Econometrica, 86, 2575-2608.
- DOVAL, L. (2018): “Whether or not to open Pandora’s box,” Journal of Economic Theory,175, 127-158.
Working papers
- L. DOVAL AND A. SMOLIN (September 2021) “Information Payoffs: An Interim Perspective.”
- L. DOVAL AND V. SKRETA (June 2021)“Purchase History and Product Personalization.”
- N. BUCHHOLZ, L. DOVAL, J. KASTL, F. MATEJKA, AND T. SALZ (August 2020)“The Value of Time Across Space: Evidence from Auctioned Cab Rides.” Revision requested at Econometrica
- L. DOVAL AND V. SKRETA (May 2021), “Optimal Mechanism for the Sale of a Durable Good,” Revision requested at Theoretical Economics, 2nd round
- L. DOVAL AND B. SZENTES (September 2021), “ On the Efficiency of Queueing in Dynamic Matching Markets”
- L. DOVAL AND V. SKRETA (June 2021), “Constrained Information Design”. Revision requested at Mathematics of Operations Research
- L. DOVAL AND J. ELY (January 2020), “Bayes’ rule where possible”
Older Working papers
- L. DOVAL (March 2018), “ A theory of stability in Dynamic Matching Markets”
- L. DOVAL (May 2016), “Dynamic and Many-to-many matching”
Videos
Dynamically Stable Matching
Laura Doval (Columbia) - 10 Mar 2021
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