Nathan Miller

Nathan Miller is an Associate Professor of Strategy and Economics at the Georgetown University McDonough School of Business. His research covers topics in the fields of industrial organization and finance, including price discrimination, cartel enforcement, cost pass-through, tacit coordination, and incomplete contracts. He has published articles in the American Economic Review, the RAND Journal of Economics, the Journal of Finance, and the Journal of Financial Economics, among other journals. His teaching portfolio at McDonough includes the core MBA course in microeconomics and strategy, and an elective MBA course on pricing. Prior to joining Georgetown University, Professor Miller served as an economist at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, where he provided economic analysis for numerous antitrust investigations, most notably the merger investigations of AT&T/T-Mobile, Bazaarvoice/Power Reviews, and Ticketmaster/Live Nation. He holds a Ph.D. in economics from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. from the University of Virginia.

Education

• University of California-Berkeley - Ph.D.
• University of Virginia-Main Campus - B.A.

Publications

Articles in Journals (16)

Nathan Miller, Matthew Osborne, and Gloria Sheu. "Pass-Through in a Concentrated Industry: Empirical Evidence and Regulatory Implications." The RAND Journal of Economics, 48, 1 (2017): 69-93.

Nathan Miller and Matthew Weinberg. "Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture." Econometrica (2017)

Nathan Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan, and Gloria Sheu. "Upward Pricing Pressure as a Predictor of Merger Price Effects." International Journal of Industrial Organization, 52 (2017): 216-247.

Nathan Miller, Marc Remer, Conor Ryan, and Gloria Sheu. "Pass-Through and the Prediction of the Merger Price Effects." Journal of Industrial Economics, 64 (2016): 684-709.

Alexander MacKay, Nathan H. Miller, Marc Remer and Gloria Sheu. "Bias in Reduced-Form Estimates of Pass-Through." Economics Letters, 123, 2 (2014): 200-202.

Nathan Miller and Matthew Osborne. "Consistency and Asymptotic Normality for Equilibrium Models with Partially Observed Outcome Variables." Economics Letters, 123, 1 (2014): 70-74.

Nathan Miller. "Modeling the Effects of Mergers in Procurement." International Journal of Industrial Organization, 37 (2014): 201-208.

Nathan Miller and Matthew Osborne. "Spatial Differentiation and Price Discrimination in the Cement Industry: Evidence from a Structural Model." RAND Journal of Economics, 45, 2 (2014): 221-247.

Ashley Langer and Nathan Miller. "Automakers' Short-Run Responses to Changing Gasoline Prices and the Implications for Energy Policy." Review of Economics and Statistics, 95, 4 (2013): 1198-1211.

Nathan Miller, Marc Remer and Gloria Sheu. "Using Cost Pass-Through to Calibrate Demand." Economics Letters, 118, 2 (2013): 451-454.

Juan Lleras and Nathan Miller. "The Entry Incentives of Complimentary Producers: A Simple Model with Implications for Antitrust Policy." Economics Letters, 110, 2 (2011): 147-150.

Allen Berger, Marco Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, Nathan Miller. "Why Do Borrowers Pledge Collateral? New Evidence on the Role of Asymmetric Information." Journal of Financial Intermediation, 20, 1 (2011): 55-70.

Nathan Miller. "Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement." American Economic Review, 99, 3 (2009): 750-768.

Allen Berger, W. Scott Frame, Nathan Miller. "Credit Scoring and the Availability, Price, and Risk of Small Business Credit." Journal of Money, Banking, and Credit, 37, 2 (2005): 191-222.

Allen Berger, Nathan Miller, Mitchell Petersen, Raghuram Rajan, Jeremy Stein. "Does Functional Form Follow Organizational Form? Evidence from the Lending Practices of Large and Small Banks." Journal of Financial Economics, 76, 2 (2005): 237-269.

Allen Berger, Marco Espinosa-Vega, W. Scott Frame, Nathan Miller. "Firm Risk, Asymmetric Information, and Loan Maturities." Journal of Finance, 60, 6 (2005): 2895-2923.

Articles in Books (1)

Aditi Mehta and Nathan Miller. "Choosing Appropriate Control Groups in Merger Evaluations." More Pros and Cons of Merger Control, 189-210. Konkerrensverket, 2012.