Xin Feng

Dr. Feng joined the Nanjing University Business School in 2019. She received her Ph.D. in economics from the National University of Singapore. Dr. Feng’s research interests are in microeconomic theory, industrial organization, and mathematical economics. Her current work focuses on the provision of incentives through information manipulation and the design of the payoff-relevant structures in auction-based marketplaces. Her work has been published in the Journal of Public Economics, Economic Inquiry, and Economics Letters.

Education

• Aug. 2012-Mar. 2017 Ph.D., Economics, National University of Singapore
• Aug. 2010-May 2012 M.S., Mathematics, National University of Singapore
• Aug. 2007-Jul. 2011 B.S., Mathematics, Suzhou University

Research Interests

• Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design (esp. Contests and Auctions)
• Information Economics, Industrial Organization

Teaching Experience

• Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, National University of Singapore, 2013–2016.
• Microeconomic Analysis I (EC2101), Spring 2016
• Game Theory & Applications to Economics (EC3312), Spring 2015
• Mathematical Economics (EC5104), Fall 2014
• Financial Economics I (EC3333), Spring 2014
• Macroeconomic Analysis I (EC2102), Fall 2013

Awards

• NUS Research Scholarship, 2012–2016, NUS, Singapore
• Travel Support, 2016, 4th Summer School of the Econometric Society.

Publications

• Lu, Jingfeng, Lixin Ye, and Xin Feng. “Orchestrating Information Acquisition.” American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2021, 13(4): 420–465​.
• Feng, Xin. “Information Disclosure on the Contest Mechanism,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 91 (2020): 148–156.
• Feng, Xin, Jingfeng Lu, and Yeneng Sun. “Ex ante Efficient Mechanism with Private Entry,” Economic Inquiry, 58-3 (2020): 1531-1541.
• Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “How to Split the Pie: Optimal Rewards in Dynamic Multi-Battle Competitions,” Journal of Public Economics, 160 (2018): 82-95.
• Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “Uniqueness of equilibrium in two-player, asymmetric Tullock contests with intermediate discriminatory power,” Economics Letters, 159 (2017): 61-64.
• Feng, Xin and Jingfeng Lu. “The Optimal Disclosure Policy in Contests with Stochastic Entry: A Bayesian Persuasion Perspective,” Economics Letters, 147 (2016): 103-107.