Yuval Salant

Rubinstein, Ariel and Yuval Salant. 2012. Eliciting Welfare Preferences from Behavioral Datasets. Review of Economic Studies. 79(1): 375-387.

An individual displays various preference orderings in different payoff-irrelevant circumstances. It is assumed that the variation in the observed preference orderings is the outcome of some cognitive process that distorts the underlying preferences of the individual. We introduce a framework for eliciting the individual's underlying preferences in such cases and then demonstrate it for two cognitive processes - satisficing and small assessment errors.

Salant, Yuval. 2007. On the Learnability of Majority Rule. Journal of Economic Theory. 135(1): 196-213.

I establish how large a sample of past decisions is required to predict future decisions of a committee with few members. The committee uses majority rule to choose between pairs of alternatives. Each members vote is derived from a linear ordering over all the alternatives. I prove that there are cases in which an observer cannot predict precisely any decision of a committee based on its past decisions. Nonetheless, approximate prediction is possible after observing relatively few random past decisions.